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ABSTRACT
It has been a remarkably difficult empirical task to identify clear-cut real effects of exchange-rate
regimes on the open economy. Similarly, no definitive view emerges as to the aggregate effects of
capital account liberalizations.  The main hypothesis of the paper is that a direct and an indirect
effect of balance-of-payments policies, geared toward exchange rate regimes and capital account
openness, exert a confounding overall influence on output growth, in the presence of sudden-stop
crises. A direct channel works through the trade and financial sectors, akin to the optimal currency
area arguments. An indirect channel works through the probability of a sudden-stop crisis. The
empirical analysis disentagles these conflicting effects and demonstrates that: (i) the balance-of-
payments policies significantly affect the probability of crises, and the crisis probability, in turn,
negatively affects output growth; (ii) controlling for the crisis probability in the growth equation,
the direct effect of balance-of-payments policies is large. Domestic price crises (high inflation above
a 20 percent threshold) affect growth only indirectly; through their positive effecton the probability
of sudden-stop crises.
Assaf Razin









Every major international economic crisis of the past 15 years (save Brazil in 2002) has
been rooted in rigid exchange rate regimes.1 Indeed, there has been a long-standing
view that an emerging economy under a peg, with government budget imbalances, trade
de￿cits, and the presence of free-market policies that facilitate the out￿ ow of capital,
is likely to become vulnerable to sudden stops of capital in￿ ows; hence, to balance of
payments crises. This is also the familiar logic of every fundamentals-driven currency
crises models in the literature.
A more nuanced view of growth e⁄ects of a peg recognizes that by ￿xing their cur-
rencies to international moneys (the Dollar or the Euro), ￿scally-disciplined emerging
economies, that are rapidly accumulating exchange reserves through export growth, are
able to maintain a high saving ratio, provide certainty to business, and pro￿t margins to
investors, based on a low and stable country speci￿c rate of interest. Under this macroeco-
nomic environment, an emerging economy could retain the con￿dence of the international
investors, and the peg leads to a good economic performance in the long run: output
growth is high, and in￿ ation is low. In other words, switching from a ￿ oat to a peg
presents the economy with a trade-o⁄: on the one hand, the risk of a currency crisis
is aggravated; but, on the other hand, if a currency crisis is avoided, the economy may
actually perform better than what it would have been under a ￿ oat.2
1Stanley Fischer (2001) observes that: ￿Each of the major international capital market-related crises
since 1994-Mexico, in 1994, Thailand, Indonesia and Korea in 1997, Russia and Brazil in 1998, and
Argentina and Turkey in 2000-has in some way involved a ￿xed or pegged exchange rate regime. At the
same time, countries that did not have pegged rates-among them South Africa, Israel in 1998, Mexico in
1998, and Turkey in 1998-avoided crises of the type that a› icted emerging market countries with pegged
rates.￿
Among the ecent papers on the vulnerability of ￿xed exchange rate regimes for developing countries,
see Calvo (2000), Calvo, Reinhart and Vegh (1995), Chang and Velasco (2000), Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf
(2000), Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1995) and Williamson (2000).
2Trade-o⁄s concerning the choice of exchange rate regimes are faced by policy makers when developing
countries struggled with bouts of high in￿ ation. A switch from ￿ oat to peg typically serves as an anchor of
the stabilization package. Examples are Israel (in 1985), and Argentina in (1991), underpinned the anti-
2It has been conspicuously di¢ cult, however, to identify clear-cut empirical real e⁄ect
of exchange-rate regimes on the real side of the open economy, for two main reasons.
The endogeneity of policy tools with respect to macroeconomic performance, and the
confounding e⁄ect of policy. Most studies focus on the ￿rst issue, typically by instru-
menting the policy variables, but ignored the later issue. The purpose of this paper is to
tackle both issues, namely, to delineate the ￿good￿and the ￿bad￿e⁄ects, arising from
a policy switch. Speci￿cally, we introduce the e⁄ect of the policy on the probability of
sudden stops of capital in￿ ows, and incorporates this projected balance-of-payments crisis
probability into the growth equation.
The Asian crisis of 1997-1998 could be viewed as a watershed in the international
economics thinking concerning exchange rate regimes, the international contagion of
macroeconomic instability from one country to another, and the deregulation of interna-
tional capital ￿ ows. One of the lessons is that, in the presence of weak ￿nancial and ￿scal
institutions, balance-of-payments crises often follow up capital account liberalizations.
Accordingly, the paper also pursues an analysis of capital-account openness policies,
in parallel to the analysis of the policy switch between a peg and a ￿ oat. Speci￿cally, we
analyze the two possibly con￿ icting channels through which a switch from a regime of
capital controls to a regime of capital-account liberalization a⁄ect growth, in the presence
of crisis-prone ￿nancial market. The de-regulation of international capital ￿ ows, work-
ing through cross-country interest parities, constrain domestic growth by enhancing the
in￿ ation policy package by an exchange rate targeting. Argentina adopted a hard peg (a currency board),
with a comprehensive capital market liberalization package, while Israel adopted a soft peg (crawling peg),
with only a phased out process towards capital market liberalization. As might have been expected, given
the world economy recession after Israel￿ s stabilization and the world economy boom that followed the
Argentine￿ s in￿ ation stabilization, Argentina grew faster than Israel in the immediate aftermath of the
￿ oat-peg policy switch. However, eventually, Argentina underwent a catastrophic currency and liquidity
crisis. As Paul Krugman puts it: ￿Argentina, once a showpiece for the new world order, quickly became
a byword for economic catastrophe￿(The New York Times, January 6, 2004). In contrast, Israel has
avoided a major crisis. Ten years after the ￿ oat-peg policy switch, the accumulated growth in Argentina
was negative, while the trend growth in Israel has been signi￿cant. See Fischer and Orsmond (2002).
3probability of ￿nancial crises.3
We also propose a re-examination of discrete high in￿ ation crises. Typically, growth
falls sharply during discrete high in￿ ation crises. By introducing a probability of domestic
(high in￿ ation) crises, along with the probability of external (balance-of-payments) crisis
that depends on the exchange rate system, we are able to further discern the non-linear
e⁄ect of the exchange rate system, or capital account openness, on growth.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section we brie￿ y survey the
relevant literature. In section 3 we describe the data. Section 4 develops the economet-
ric approach. In section 5 we report our ￿ndings using the IMF exchange-rate-regime
classi￿cation. In section 6, we use the new Reinhart and Rogo⁄ classi￿cation, incorpo-
rate domestic price crises into the empirical analysis and report our ￿ndings. The paper
concludes in section 7.
2 Literature
Recall that it has been a di¢ cult empirical task to identify clear-cut real e⁄ects of
exchange-rate regimes on the open economy. Indeed, Marianne Baxter and Alan Stock-
man (1989) and Robert Flood and Andy Rose (1995) ￿nd that there are no signi￿cant
di⁄erences in business cycles across exchange rate regimes.4
3Many economists, who, on trade matters, take a complete free-market position, nevertheless are
cautious about complete capital account liberalization. Kaushik Basu (2003) puts this issue succinctly:
"For one, the capital market (unlike the market for goods) seldom takes the form in which an agent
can borrow as much as she wishes at the going interest rate. Moreover, a person demanding capital is,
typically, asked by the lender to explain why she needs the money. The greengrocer, on the other hand,
does not ask you why you want oranges before he agrees to sell you some."
4An exception is Rose (2000). In the paper, Rose uses evidence from existing currency unions in
the world economy, to estimate the e⁄ect of currency unions on international trade. Rose ￿nds that a
currency union (which is an extreme form of a peg) expands bilateral trade between two average member
countries by a huge proportion (200%, and more). Rose￿ s analysis was challenged by Persson (2001).
But he also ￿nds signi￿cant, albeit a more modest, e⁄ect of currency unions. See also a recent study by
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenneger (2000), who ￿nd real e⁄ects of exchange-rate regime in cross-country data.
4Similarly, no de￿nitive view emerges as to the aggregate e⁄ects of capital account
liberalizations. Eichengreen (2001) overviews the literature, pointing to the lack of the
profession￿ s understanding of the policies. Rodrik (1998) ￿nds no signi￿cant statistical
association between capital account openness and growth. A more de￿nite view con-
cerning positives e⁄ects of capital account liberalization on output, which is advanced by
Fischer (1998), is supported by some evidence, provided by Quinn (1997). The role of
preexisting policies, and of trade-account-capital-account sequencing, in determining the
e⁄ects of capital control liberalization on growth and investment, is examined by Arteta,
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001), Chinn and Ito (2002), and Tornell, Westermann, and
Martinez (2004).5
The multiple-equilibrium ￿nancial crises theory does not provide a clear guide as to
the role played by self-ful￿lling expectations in ￿nancial crises. This is because in the
theory the probability of a crisis is loosely related to the fundamentals.6 Thus, it leaves as
an open question whether observed fundamentals, such as government de￿cits, are su¢ -
cient to explain crisis outcomes; or whether there is a large unexplained component, that
is attributed to self-ful￿lling expectations. This feature of the theory runs counter to the
intuition that bad fundamentals are more likely to trigger a currency crisis. Indeed, the
more recent ￿nancial-crisis theory demonstrates that, in the presence of asymmetric infor-
5See also Ariyoshi et al (2000), Bhagwati (1998), Edwards (1999, 2000) and Kaplan and Rodrik
(2000). Note that the Chinese Renminbi has been pegged to the US Dollar throughout the the Asian
crisis, and also after the crisis. At the same time, China went through a gradual process of removing
the constraints on its closed capital account, while maintaining the rigid ￿xed exchange rate. Its high
growth performance, since 1978, is by now well established. East Asia is moving currently towards closer
cooperation on trade, bonds markets, currencies, and the management of foreign exchange reserves, which
may eventually lead to a common Asian currency.
6The 1992 EMS currency crisis inspired the second-generation models, as in Obstfeld (1994). He
explained crises as a consequence of a con￿ ict between ￿xed exchange rate and the central bank desire to
pursue more expansionary monetary policy, than what is consistent with the exchange rate and capital
market regimes. The resulting pressure, in the foreign exchange market, can lead to multiple self-ful￿lling
expectations equilibria. The emerging market currency crises of 1997-8 inspired the third generation
model of currency crises, generating subtle mechanisms with multiple self-ful￿lling expectations equilibria.
5mation, even a small amount of uncertainty with respect to the fundamentals, transforms
the equilibrium set into a unique fundamentals-driven equilibrium.7 For example, Morris
and Shin (2000) develop a model where the fundamentals and the crisis-driven outcomes
are indeed correlated. Importantly, self ful￿lling beliefs can be summarized by a unique
probability of crisis, which, in turn, is a function of observed fundamentals. Speci￿cally,
when the fundamentals are weak, the probability is large, and vice versa. The asymmetric
-equilibrium setup implies that fundamentals-driven market expectations determine ulti-
mately the observed performance of the economy. This justi￿es our econometric approach,
where the probability of balance-of-payments crisis is at the center of the analysis.
2.1 Data set
Our original data set consists of 106 low-and middle-income countries (48 African coun-
tries, 26 Asian countries, 26 countries from Latin America and the Caribbean, and 5 Eu-
ropean countries). A subset of 100 countries, for which we have complete data, is listed in
Table 1. The main source of data is the World Bank (World Development Indicators and
Global Development Finance). The annual data ranges from 1971 to 1996. The data on
100 countries over the period 1971-1997 is assembled by Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and
Assaf Razin (2000).
The IMF standard o¢ cial classi￿cation of exchange rate regimes prior to 1997, as
described in the various issues of the IMF￿ s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrange-
ments and Exchange Rate Restrictions, was completely revamped by the pioneering work
of Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2004).
Capital-account openness data are based on a weighted- average index of several cate-
gories restrictions on capital account transactions, reported in the IMF Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.8 Data on GDP per capita is taken
from Summers and Heston Penn Tables 5.6. Real Exchange Rate, Fiscal Balance are
7See, for example, Goldstein and Pauzner (1999).
8These are rule-based, but not quantitative measures. For alternative measures, see also Edison et al
(2004).
6taken from the World Bank World Tables.
In this paper we take advantage of both the IMF and the Reinhart-Rogo⁄ classi￿ca-
tions of exchange-rate regimes. We start with the IMF classi￿cation, for which we have
the complete sample of countries. We then repeat the analysis, using the Reinhart-Rogo⁄
classi￿cation using a sub-sample of 58 countries.
2.2 Sudden stop crises and policy switches
Our objective is to explain empirically the e⁄ects of balance-of-payments policies on out-
put growth, for economies where balance-of-payments crises are probable. Policy switch
and a balance-of-payments crisis state are indicated by a binary variable.
Sudden stop crises are de￿nes by a sharp depreciation in the real exchange rate. In
doing so we attempt to capture the e⁄ects of the crisis on the real side of the economy.9
Speci￿cally, we think of the channel which emphasizes the role of the ￿rm￿ s balance sheet
in determining its ability to invest; and the way the ￿rm reacts to large and unexpected
real depreciations. Evidently, unexpected ￿ uctuations in the real exchange rate, rather
than the ￿ uctuations in the nominal exchange rate, are the ones which are likely to have
signi￿cant balance-sheet e⁄ects.10 Concretely, the balance-of-payments crisis is de￿ned
by sharp changes of the real exchange rate, with a 15 percent-per-year threshold.
Table 2 describes the frequency of sudden-stop crises, exchange-rate regime, and
capital-account policy switches. Overall, about 22% of the observations are associated
9Typically in the currency crisis literature sudden stops are measured by free falls in the nominal
exchange rate. However, this does not distinguish between domestic price crises and balance-of-payments
crises. In our indicator, crisis episodes do not include, therefore, countries which su⁄er from bouts of
high in￿ ation and currency depreciation, but with a relatively stable real exchange rate, because they
do not qualify to be classi￿ed as balanced-of-payments crises. Evidently, the real exchange rate measure
for crisis is strongly correlated with sharp reversals in the current-account balance. See Milesi-Ferretti
and Razin (2000). See also Calvo, Izquierdo and Majia (2004) on sudden stops and real exchange rate
￿ uctuations.
10See Bacchetta, Aghion and Banerjee (2001), Krugman (2000), Allen, Rosenberg, Keller, Sester, and
Roubini (2002), and Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999).
7with balance-of-payments crises; an average of 1% to 4% of the observations indicate a
￿ oat-to-peg, peg-to-￿ oat, liberalization-to-capital-controls, or capital-controls-to-liberalization
policy switches.
3 The Econometric Framework
To evaluate the cyclical and the persistent growth e⁄ects of the exchange-rate-regime
policy switch and a capital-account-openness policy switch, we address two econometric
issues. First, the potentially confounding e⁄ect on growth of the policy switch, working
through the two con￿ icting channels. Second, the potential endogeneity of policy.
3.1 The statistical model
Let Y1;j;t denote the growth rate of country j in time t as measured in terms of GDP per
capita. Let Y ￿
2;j;t denote a latent variable indicating the crisis prone state of the economy.
That is, if Y ￿
2;j;t ￿ 0; a currency crises occurs, whereas if Y ￿
2;j;t < 0 a currency crises does









where, Y2;j;t is a binary variable which equals 1 if currency crises occurs in country j at
time t and 0 otherwise.
Consider two policies: (i) a ￿ oat-peg policy and (ii) a liberalization-controls policy.














1 if capital controls
0 if liberalization
: (3)
8To simplify let us assume that both Y1;j;t and Y2;j;t can be expressed as a linear function
of policy variables (D1; D2), standard controls (X). The growth equation is as follows.
Y1;j;t = ￿1Xj;t + ￿1D1;j;t + ￿1D2;j;t + ￿1Y
￿
2;j;t + "1;j;t; (4)
where, "1;j;t is a country speci￿c time variant i:i:d: random shock. Similarly the latent




2;j;t = ￿2Zj;t + ￿2D1;j;t + ￿2D1;j;t + ￿2Y1;j;t + "2;j;t; (5)
where, "2;j;t is a country speci￿c time variant i:i:d: random shock.
Let Pj;t be the conditional probability that country j will face currency crisis in period
t; that is Pj;t = Pr(Y2;j;t = 1 j ￿): Given our assumption,
Pj;t = Pr(￿2Zj;t + ￿2D1;j;t + ￿2D1;j;t + ￿2Y1;j;t > ￿"2;j;t) (6)
Assuming that "2;j;t ￿ N (0;1) then:
Pj;t = ￿(￿2Zj;t + ￿2D1;j;t + ￿2D2;j;t + ￿2Y1;j;t) (7)
where ￿ is the cdf of the unit normal distribution (above).
Note that we can identify the parameters of the ￿crisis-selection" equation by estimat-
ing the Probit equation (7);where the projected likelihood is:
^ Pj;t = ￿
￿
^ ￿Zj;t + ^ ￿2D1;j;t + ^ ￿2D1;j;t + ^ ￿2Y1;j;t
￿
(8)
Assuming momentarily that policy is exogenous11 we could recover the parameters of
interest in the growth equation by estimating the following equation:








Equation (9) provides consistent estimates for the parameters of interest.
11Typically, policy action is endogenous. Thus obviously we cannot identify the parameters of interest
using the OLS estimators for equations (4) and (7). Therefore, we use lag variables to instrument policy
variables D1;j;t and D2;j;t.
93.2 The confounding e⁄ect of policies
To illustrate the importance of incorporating crises state into the empirical analysis as-
sume that the standard growth equation is estimated using valid instrument for policy vari-
ables. Consider the confounding of the direct and indirect e⁄ects of balance-of-payments
policies on growth.

















































1;j;t are the instrumented policy variables.
It is common wisdom that the likelihood of currency crisis has a negative e⁄ect on
growth:
￿1 < 0 (12)
It is also common to assume that a peg exchange rate increases the likelihood of a
currency crisis (all other things equal), and that capital controls reduce the probability






















= ￿1 + ￿1
@E (￿￿1)
@D1;j;t
< ￿1 > 0; (14)







= ￿1 + ￿1
@E (￿￿1)
@D2;j;t
> ￿1 < 0: (15)
10Note that the @E (￿￿1)=@D1;j;t and @E (￿￿1)=@D1;j;t are the the (sample) average









@D2;j;t for country with weak fundamentals. Moreover, by ignoring the likeli-
hood of a sudden stops crisis, in evaluating the e⁄ect of peg-￿ oat or liberalization-controls
policies on growth, one understates the direct e⁄ect of each one of these policies. Namely,
the ceteris paribus positive e⁄ect of a peg policy on growth is biased downwardly to zero
and the ceteris paribus negative e⁄ect of capital controls on growth is upwardly biased
toward zero.
Why should a policy maker care about the ceteris paribus e⁄ect of a policy rather
than the reduced form e⁄ect?
Our model makes clear that the overall e⁄ect of policy (D1 and D2); via the crisis-
probability channel, is intrinsically non-linear. There is a range of values of the deter-
minant variables in which the e⁄ect of policy on the likelihood of a crisis is large, and
another where it is small. Accordingly, the overall e⁄ect of the policy on growth depends
on the values of determinants of the the crisis probability.
4 IMF classi￿cation: ￿ndings
We estimate both the cyclical as well as the persistent e⁄ects of exchange-rate and capital-
controls regimes on growth, controlling for their e⁄ect on the likelihood of a sudden-stop
crisis. We report out ￿ndings in Table 3 and Table 4.
We start with the e⁄ects of ￿ oat-peg and capital-controls-liberalizations switches. We
do so, with, and without country ￿xed e⁄ects. To underscore the role of policy on growth
via its indirect e⁄ect on the probability of a crisis, we estimate each speci￿cation twice,
including and excluding the probability of a crisis.
The main ￿ndings of Table 3 are: (i) Confounding the direct and indirect e⁄ects, if the
crisis probability is absent from the growth equation, we ￿nd negligible e⁄ects of policy
switches; (ii) Policy switches do a⁄ect the likelihood of a crisis: a switch from ￿ oat to
11peg increases the probability of a crisis by approximately 30 percent; similarly, capital
controls reduce the likelihood of a crisis by the same order of magnitude; (iii) Controlling
for the crisis probability in the growth equation, we ￿nd a substantial positive e⁄ect of the
switch from a ￿ oat to a peg and a substantial negative e⁄ect of imposing capital controls,
with about the same order of magnitude.
Turning to the e⁄ects in the short and the long run, Table 4 demonstrates that: (i)
While policy switches do a⁄ect the crisis probability, policy levels do not; (ii) Controlling
for the crisis probability in the growth equation, the two policy switches, as well as the two
policy levels, a⁄ect growth; (iii) However, conditioning out the country (time) invariant
heterogeneity, policy switches, but not policy levels, a⁄ect growth; (iv) Controlling for
country ￿xed e⁄ect, we ￿nd that the long run e⁄ects of policies are insigni￿cant. The
latter is due to the fact that it is hard to distinguish between country ￿xed e⁄ects and
the permanent e⁄ects of exchange rate regime and capital controls on growth.
125 The Reinhart-Rogo⁄ classi￿cation and the role of
domestic price crises
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) have emphasized that many countries that claim to have
￿ oating exchange rates do not allow the exchange rate to ￿ oat freely, but rather deploy
interest rate and intervention policy to a⁄ect its behavior. From this point they appear to
draw two conclusions: ￿rst, that the claim that countries are moving away from adjustable
peg exchange rate systems is incorrect; and second, that countries for good reasons hanker
after ￿xed exchange rates, which they can best obtain through hard pegs. This idea
prompted an interest in a new classi￿cation of exchange rate regimes. Reinhart and
Rogo⁄ (2004) attempt to measure the implications of the "fear of ￿ oating" problem.
The IMF standard o¢ cial classi￿cation of exchange rate regimes prior to 1997, as
described in the various issues of the IMF￿ s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrange-
ments and Exchange Rate Restrictions, was thereby completely revamped by Reinhart
and Rogo⁄ (2004). They classify the regimes in a range from free falling to a hard peg
like in the CFA franc zone in Africa.
In line with Reinhart and Rogo⁄ our ￿ndings in the previous section that exchange-
rate policy switches, rather than policy levels, a⁄ect growth, may re￿ ect some miss-
classi￿cations.
Domestic price crises have been also the subject of growth research. For the empirical
literature that looks at the relationships between in￿ ation and growth, Bruno and Easterly
(1998) propose a method which is based on discrete high in￿ ation crises. That is, periods
when in￿ ation is above some threshold, say 40 percent a year. They ￿nd that growth
falls sharply during discrete high in￿ ation crises, then recovers quickly after in￿ ation falls
below the threshold. Their approach, however, implies that growth is negatively a⁄ected
by in￿ ation only above the threshold. In other words, in￿ ation a⁄ects growth only when
a domestic crisis prices in fact occurs. In contrast, our approach points to the role of the
fundamentals as re￿ ected in the probability of a crisis on growth, even if the crisis episode
is not realized.
13One way to model the e⁄ect of the fundamentals underlying a domestic price crisis
on growth is by adding the probability of the domestic price crises as an argument in the
growth equation (see equation (4)). Another way is to incorporate these fundamentals
directly as an argument in the sudden stop probability equation (5).
We preview the estimation of the model with basic statistics about ￿ oat-peg switches,
external and domestic crises. Table 5a describes the frequency of currency and price crises
in the sub-sample for which we have the Reinhart-Rogo⁄classi￿cation. Table 5b describes
the frequency of exchange-rate regime switches. Comparing the table 5a and 5b to Table
1, we see that in the new classi￿cation of exchange rate regimes the frequency of exchange
rate policy switches is signi￿cantly larger.
In Table 6 we report our estimates for the growth equation using the Reinhart-Rogo⁄
classi￿cation.
We ￿nd, like in the IMF classi￿cation, that the probability of sudden stops is a major
factors in explaining the variation in the persistent growth of countries. Classifying into
￿ oat and peg using the Reinhst-rogo⁄ classi￿cation we ￿nd that the policy level, rather
than policy switch, a⁄ect signi￿cantly growth. Now turn to the e⁄ect of domestic nominal
prices on growth. When domestic price crises are excluded as a determinant of real
exchange rate crisis probability, the latter has a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on growth.
Similarly, when domestic price crises are included as a determinant of a sudden stop crisis
probability, the latter has a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on growth. But, when both the
sudden stop crisis probability, which includes nominal price crises, and the sudden stop
crisis probability, which excludes nominal price crisis, appear in the growth equation, only
the former has a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect. This means that a nominal price crisis a⁄ects
growth only via its a⁄ect on sudden stop crises.
6 Conclusion
Our model makes clear that the overall e⁄ect of balance-of-payments policy is intrinsically
non-linear, via the crisis-probability channel. There is a range of the explanatory variables
14in which the e⁄ect of policy on the likelihood of a crisis is substantial, whereas there
are other ranges where it is not. The expected ceteris paribus e⁄ect of a policy switch
varies with the magnitude of the crisis-probability. Accordingly, exogenous shocks to the
underlying economy a⁄ect the desirability of policies such as exchange-rate regime and
capital-account liberalization.
Many developing countries, which have switched from ￿ oat to peg, did so as a means of
stabilizing in￿ ation.12 Nonetheless they experienced di⁄erent growth rates. For instance,
consider the switched from ￿ oat to peg in Israel ( 1985) and in Argentina (1991). Israel
managed the probability of sudden stops by gradual liberalization and a more ￿ exible
exchange-rate policy. In contrast, Argentina hankered around a currency board system
and fully liberalized its capital account, both increasing the probability of sudden stops.
This may explain the di⁄erent growth performances of these two countries.
Future research can address also the issue of dollarization. Conventional wisdom sug-
gests that a switch from a ￿ oat to a peg reinforces dollarization. Currency crises in
dollarized economies are expected to be triggered by self-ful￿lling expectations, and have
adverse output e⁄ects through a balance-sheet-crisis mechanism (as in Paul Krugman
(2000)). Reinhart, Rogo⁄and Savastano (2004) ￿nd that dollarization appear to increase
exchange rate pass-through. This mechanism may reinforce the claim that ￿fear of ￿ oat-
ing￿is a greater problem for highly dollarized developing economies.13
Our approach should not be limited to the study of sudden stops crises, balance-
of-payments policies and growth. In fact, this framework is potentially useful for the
evaluation of policies, when the fundamentals of a crisis a⁄ect the desired outcomes, yet
their realizations are not very frequent. For example, monetary and ￿scal policies may
often a⁄ect the fundamentals behind banks and stock market crises. Proper evaluation of
these policies should not ignore their e⁄ect on the probability of a crisis, although actual
crises are not very frequent.
12For an integrated analysis see Calvo and Vegh (1999).
13See also Calvo and Reinhart (2000).
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20Table 1:
The Frequency of Crises, Switches Between Float and Peg and 
Switches between Capital Controls and Liberalizations (%)
Variable Frequency
Crsises 22.61
Switches to peg  1.71
Switches to float 3.91
Switches to controls 1.03
Switches to liberalizations 0.9Table 2:
List of Countries
(1) Algeria (51) Malawi
(2) Argentina (52) Malaysia
(3) Bangladesh (53) Maldives
(4) Barbados (54) Mali
(5) Belize (55) Malta
(6) Benin (56) Mauritania
(7) Bhutan (57) Mauritius
(8) Bolivia (58) Mexico
(9) Botswana (59) Morocco
(10) Brazil (60) Myanmar
(11) Burkina Faso (61) Nepal
(12) Burundi (62) Nicaragua
(13) Cameroon (63) Niger
(14) Cape Verde (64) Nigeria
(15) Central African (65) Oman
(16) Chad (66) Pakistan
(17) Chile (67) Panama
(18) China (68) Papua New Guinea
(19) Colombia (69) Paraguay
(20) Comoros (70) Peru
(21) Congo (71) Philippines
(22) Cote d'Ivoire (72) Portugal
(23) Dominican Rep. (73) Romania
(24) Ecuador (74) Rwanda
(25) Egypt, Arab Rep (75) Sao Tome and Pr
(26) El Salvador (76) Senegal
(27) Equatorial Guin (77) Seychelles
(28) Ethiopia (78) Sierra Leone
(29) Fiji (79) Solomon Islands
(30) Gabon (80) Somalia
(31) Gambia, The (81) South Africa
(32) Ghana (82) Sri Lanka
(33) Grenada (83) St. Vincent
(34) Guatemala (84) Sudan
(35) Guinea (85) Swaziland
(36) Guinea-Bissau (86) Syrian Arab Rep
(37) Guyana (87) Tanzania
(38) Haiti (88) Thailand
(39) Honduras (89) Togo
(40) Hungary (90) Trinidad and To
(41) India (91) Tunisia
(42) Indonesia (92) Turkey
(43) Iran, Islamic R (93) Uganda
(44) Jamaica (94) Uruguay
(45) Jordan (95) Vanuatu
(46) Kenya (96) Venezuela
(47) Lao PDR (97) Western Samoa
(48) Lesotho (98) Zaire
(49) Liberia (99) Zambia
(50) Madagascar (100) ZimbabweTable 3:
Exchange Regime and Capital Controls: Cyclical Effects
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Growth Rates
OLS OLS FE FE
Variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Switching to peg between t-2 to t-1 1.6423 4.6209 1.2041 5.0215
(0.7503)* (1.4795)** (0.9958) (1.7630)**
Switching to float between t-2 to t-1 0.1761 0.6383 -0.0539 0.2005
(0.6483) (0.6692) (0.7039) (0.7401)
Switching to Capital Controls between t-2 to t-1 -1.8832 -4.7173 -1.9592 -6.3843
(0.8616)* (1.5363)** (1.0495) (2.0713)**
The probability of having currency crisis this year ^ -9.6164 -12.7791
(5.0663) (4.9934)*
Controllers
1970 GDP per capita -0.0012 -0.0011 -- --
(0.0005)* (0.0005)*
Currency crisis at time t-1 0.5612 2.7602 0.7579 2.5482
(0.5949) (1.2740)* (0.4506) (0.8331)**
Currency crisis at time t-2 -2.1345 -1.5347 -1.6442 -2.2155
(0.6375)** (0.7221)* (0.4525)** (0.4852)**
Growth rate at time t-1 0.2540 0.2552 0.1802 0.2267
(0.0464)** (0.0469)** (0.0275)** (0.0312)**
Growth rate at time t-2 0.1093 0.1048 0.0069 -0.0224
(0.0366)** (0.0372)** (0.0274) (0.0313)
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Currency Crisis (0,1). 1 if REE(t)-REE(t-1)>15% - Probit (dF/dX) estimators
1970's GDP per capita 0.0000 --
(0.0000)
Switching to peg between t-2 to t-1 0.3125 0.2893
(0.0991)** (0.1028)**
Switching to float t-2 to t-1 0.0557 0.0325
(0.0510) (0.0516)
Switching to Capital Controls between t-2 to t-1 -0.2656 -0.3313
(0.0470)** (0.0524)**
Currency crisis at time t-1 0.2299 0.1314
(0.0377)** (0.0349)**
Currency crisis at time t-2 0.0563 -0.0307
(0.0296) (0.0256)
Government def t-1 ^^ 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Country fixed-effects No Yes
Note:
Data includes 106 countries in the years 1970 to 1997
^ Currency crisis =1 if the real exchange rate increased by 15% between t-1 to t (1 STD)
All specifications include linear time trend
( ) Standard errors in parenthesis
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Table 4:
Exchange Regime and Capital Controls: Cyclical and Persistent Effects
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Growth Rates
OLS FE
Variables (i) (ii)
Peg at time t-1 -0.6088 -0.1813
(0.2899)* (0.4787)
Switching to peg between t-2 to t-1 3.9786 4.9046
(1.2935)** (1.4604)**
Switching to float between t-2 to t-1 0.4657 0.8090
(0.7124) (0.8382)
Capital Controls at t-1 -1.2843 -1.1997
(0.4539)** (0.9385)
Switching to Capital Controls between t-2 to t-1 -1.2843 -5.9101
(0.4539)** (1.7511)**
The probability of having currency crisis this year ^ -7.9131 -13.7764
(6.0140) (4.4409)**
Controllers
1970 GDP per capita -0.0013 --
(0.0006)*
Currency crisis at time t-1 2.3069 2.6221
(1.4183) (0.7543)**
Currency crisis at time t-2 -1.7389 -2.3438
(0.7269)* (0.4911)**
Growth rate at time t-1 0.2481 0.2247
(0.0456)** (0.0312)**
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Currency Crisis (0,1). 1 if REE(t)-REE(t-1)>15% - Probit (dF/dX) estimato
1970's GDP per capita 0.0000 --
(0.0000)
Peg at time t-1 -0.0192 0.0368
(0.0221) (0.0361)
Switching to peg between t-2 to t-1 0.2798 0.2106
(0.1029)** (0.1070)*
Switching to float t-2 to t-1 0.0801 0.1085
(0.0567) (0.0674)
Capital Controls at t-1 -0.0383 -0.1021
(0.0283) (0.0639)
Switching to Capital Controls between t-2 to t-1 -0.2491 -0.2820
(0.0513)** (0.0646)**
Currency crisis at time t-1 0.2264 0.1255
(0.0373)** (0.0345)**
Country fixed-effects No Yes
Note:
Data includes 106 countries in the years 1970 to 1997
^ Currency crisis =1 if the real exchange rate increased by 15% between t-1 to t (1 STD)
All specifications include linear time trend
( ) Standard errors in parenthesis
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Table 5.a:
The Frequency of Sudden Stop and Domestic Prices Crises 
Using Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) Classification*,**
Domestic Price Crises
01
Sudden Stops 0 24.6 9.9 34.5
Crises
1 29.3 36.3 65.5
53.9 46.1 100.0
Notes:
* Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) classified into 5 categories: (i) peg, 
 (ii) limited flexibility, (iii) managed floating , (iv) freely floating and (v) freely falling.
 We aggregate it into 2 main categories: (i) peg_rr, including the first 3 and (ii) 
 float_rr, including the other two.
** Data includes 58 countries in the years 1970 to 1997
Domestic prices crisis = 1 if the inflation rate is above 20% per year and 0 otherwise.
Sudden stop crisis = 1 if the real exchange rate depreciation is above 15% per year and 0 otherwise.Table 5.b:
Switches Between Float and Peg
Using Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) Classification*,**
Variable Frequency
Switches to peg  10.18
Switches to float 9.97
Notes:
* Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) classified into 5 categories: (i) peg, 
 (ii) limited flexibility, (iii) managed floating , (iv) freely floating and (v) freely falling.
 We aggregate it into 2 main categories: (i) peg_rr, including the first 3 and (ii) 
 float_rr, including the other two.
** Data includes 58 countries in the years 1970 to 1997Table 6:
Exchange Regime and Capital Controls
Using Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) Classification*,**
Fixed-Effects Estimators
Dependent Variable: Growth Rates
Variables (i) (ii) (iii)
Peg at time t-1 1.656 1.330 1.729
(0.557) (0.549) (0.565)
Capital Controls at t-1 -0.439 -0.587 0.156
(0.890) (0.991) (1.022)
Switching to Capital Controls between t-2 to t-1 -5.852 -3.374 -6.155
(1.799) (1.518) (1.809)
The probability of having currency crisis this year^ -14.843 -22.359
excluding the effect of price crisis (4.937) (7.996)
The probability of having currency crisis this year - real^^ -6.824 7.632
including the effect of price crisis  (4.084) (6.578)
Controllers
Growth rate at time t-1 0.176 0.191 0.183
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Growth rate at time t-2 0.008 0.022 0.019
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Currency crisis at time t-1 2.812 0.917 3.340
(0.978) (0.629) (1.069)
Currency crisis at time t-2 -1.904 -1.804 -1.831
(0.479) (0.483) (0.481)
Price (CPI) crisis at time t-1 -0.100 1.078 -1.251
(0.491) (0.772) (1.133)
Price (CPI) crisis at time t-2 0.385 0.374 0.468
(0.488) (0.491) (0.490)
Notes:
* Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) classified into 5 categories: (i) peg, (ii) limited flexibility, (iii) managed floating
, (iv) freely floating and (v) freely falling. We aggregate it into 2 main categories: (i) peg_rr, including the first 3 and (ii) 
float_rr, including the other two.
** Data includes 58 countries in the years 1970 to 1997
^ The estimated the likelihood for a currency crisis ignoring the effect of price crisis.
^^ The estimated probability for a currency crisis including the effect of past price crisis
All specifications include linear time trend
( ) Standard errors in parenthesis